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Kramer et al.: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California law, a regular feature of
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions of special importance to women. A brief
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised
in ea~h case is provided.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FAMILY LAW
A. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
1. Presumption of community property is
not affected by a time-limited antenuptial
agreement. ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2. An antenuptial agreement that promotes
divorce is void as against public policy. ..
B. CHILD CUSTODY
1. The custody rights of an unmarried father
who is an unemancipated minor are
subordinate ,to the state's interest in
avoiding environment which is detrimental to the child. .......................
2. To terminate parental rights, there must
be clear and convincing evidence that severance is the least detrimental alternative
to protect the child's welfare. . . . . . . . . . ..
3. In an action to terminate parental rights,
the court's paramount consideration is
providing a loving, stable home for the minor. ..................................
4. In custody disputes between a noncustodial parent and a nonparent, the
nonparent shall prevail if it is in the best
interests of the child. ..................

558
561

562

567

570

572

555

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6

556 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

1.

D.

[Vol. 16:555

The doctrine of resulting trust bars one
spouse from destroying the other's community property interest in military retirement benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 574

HEALTH AND WELFARE

1. Income tax refunds should not be de-

ducted frm grant checks of aid to families
with dependent children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 576
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A.

EVIDENCE

1. A mother's testimony of her young child's

out-of-court statement does not violate
the hearsay rule or the confrontation
clause. . ..... .... . . ....... . .... .. . .. ... 579
B.

SENTENCING

1. Before a defendant is sentenced to consec-

utive terms for multiple counts of oral
copulation, a jury must specifically find
he used force or threats. ............... 582
C.

SEX OFFENSES

1. A woman raped by a former lover is enti-

tled to benefits under the Victims of Violent Crimes Act regardless of whether
criminal prosecution occurs. ........... 583
2. A child molester may not exploit a technicality in order to avoid registering as a sex
offender. ............................. 586
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A.

EDUCATION

1.

B.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

1.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/6

The rule denying reimbursement to parents who unilaterally place their handicapped child in a private educational facility is subject to exception in cases of
bad faith. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 588
A four year delay in filing sexual harassment charges against a state university
professor was held unreasonable and prejudicial. ............................... 591

2

Kramer et al.: California Law Survey

1986]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
A. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. Black women are a cognizable group for
the purpose of showing discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in jury selection. .. . ........... ....... .............
2. Penal Code section 273.5 prohibiting corporal abuse of spouses or cohabiting partners does not violate the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution.
V. TORTS
A. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
1. Plaintiff, barred by the statute of limitations on a defective product action, may
proceed with suit by alleging that the
manufacturer's fraud was a percipient
cause of the injury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2. The statute of limitations in DES cases
does not begin to run until plaintiff knows
or should know all the elements of the
cause of action. .......................

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

557

595

597

598

601

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6

558

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:555

I.

FAMILY LAW

A.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

1.

Presumption of community property is not affected by a
time-limited antenuptial agreement.

In re Marriage of Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (4th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in In
re Marriage of Grinius reversed the trial court's judgment that
restaurant real property was separate property, and directed the
court to determine whether the husband should be reimbursed
for separate property contributions.
On the date of their marriage, the parties, Joyce and Victor,
entered into an antenuptial agreement providing that separate
property obtained before marriage be maintained as such for six
years. After that, the parties' rights and obligations would be as
provided by law. While married, the couple purchased a restaurant with two purchase money loans. One loan, secured by separate and community property, was used for the down payment,
remodeling the premises, purchasing equipment and paying both
living and business expenses. The other loan was secured by a
first deed of trust on the restaurant property. Without Joyce's
knowledge, Victor placed title to the restaurant property in his
name only.
Upon dissolution of the marriage, Victor relied on the antenuptial agreementl to support a separate property claim on the
restaurant and to overcome the presumption of community
property.2 He asserted that because he took title in his name
only, believing the antenuptial agreement entitled him to do so,
he was the sole owner of the restaurant.
The Grinius court disagreed with him, reasoning that the
agreement was an' attempt to maintain the separate character of
1. See Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 212 (1956). "Parties contemplating
marriage may validly contract as to their property rights, both as to property then owned
by them and as to property, including earnings, which may be acquired by them after
marriage." I d.
2. CAL, Cry. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986). "[A]ll real property situated in
this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during the marriage by a
married person while domiciled in this state ... is community property . . . ." Id.
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certain assets acquired prior to and during the marriage, but was
time-limited. The court concluded that such agreements can
control,3 but even if this contract granted Victor such authority,
it expired before the dissolution action. Thus the community
presumption was retroactively reinstated.
By the terms of the contract, six years after the marriage
date, and retroactive to it, the spouses were reinvested with
every communal right. The court therefore held that the presumption of· community property was not affected by the antenuptial agreement.
Victor also asserted that his separate property funds were
used to make substantial payments on both loans and to retire
one of them. Citing In re Marriage of Mix,4- he claimed thai the
purchase money loan payments derived from separate property
and since the restaurant property was so acquired, the same separate character was maintained. The court of appeal pointed out
that in See v. See/' the determination of whether property is
separate or community was made at the time of acquisition.
Since the property here was acquired after the marriage, it was
presumed to be community property.6
In looking at the character of the credit acquisitions during
marriage, the court relied on the "intent of the lender" rule developed in In re Marriage of Aufmuth.7 In Aufmuth, the court
of appeal decided that the character of such acquisitions was determined by whether the lender relied on the collateral as separate property or as a community asset.
In applying the "intent of the lender" rule, the court said
that California courts have consistently employed this rule, but
with inconsistent results. The arinius court decided that the
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1976) (parties are bound by the terms of the antenuptial agreement as long as marriage
dissolution is not thereby being promoted or encouraged). The validity of such agreements turns on the language within the contract itself.
4. 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975) (separate property can be
established by tracing directly to the source of funds used for acquisition of the property
in question).
5. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
7. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
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standard shall be that the acquisition of loan proceeds during
marriage are presumptively community property. This presumption may be overcome by showing the lender intended to rely
solely upon' separate property in offering the loan. Since one of
the loans was based upon the community's ability to manage the
restaurant and repay the note, and the other was extended in
reliance on the already acquired interest in the restaurant, the
court did not find evidence of such intent. Thus, it found that
the loan funds were a community asset and not separate
property.
Although Joyce maintained that reimbursement should be
granted solely for Victor's separate property contributions to the
restaurant property, the court rejected that premise. Civil Code
section 4800.28 controlled the separate property issue and required the court to find how much of the total community acquisitions could be traced to Victor's contributions from his separate property. The parties had not presented evidence on the
reimbursement issue and since Victor's separate property contribution was so commingled with the community acquisitions, the
court of appeal reversed the trial court as to the entire property
division.
In an effort to reach a just resolution, the Grinius court
looked critically at the antenuptial agreement and by upholding
its terms, essentially deactivated its effect on acquisitions during
the first six years of marriage. In so doing, the court made it all
the more important for the parties of such an agreement to be
careful in its wording. They will be held to its terms.
In addition, by reaffirming the "intent of the lender" rule
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986).

In the division of community property under this part unless a
party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement
or signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party
shall be reimbursed for his or her contributions to the acquisition of the property to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.
[d. This statute applies to actions not yet final on January 1, 1984. It refers to reimbursement of separate property contributions traceable to community property acquisitions including: down payments, payments for property improvements and payments reducing the principal of a loan used to finance any property purchase or improvement. It
does not include loan interest payments or any maintenance, insurance or property tax
payments. [d.
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and in utilizing the simple test of lender sole reliance, the court
applied a more equitable method of determining the character of
loan acquisitions. This is consistent with the underlying policy
of California's community property plan-to equally divide all
community assets in a marital dissolution.

Linda C. Kr-amer
2.

An antenuptial agreement that promotes divorce is void as
against public policy.

In re Marriage of Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 153 (6th Dist. 1985). In In re Marriage of Noghrey, the
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and found an
antenuptial agreement to be invalid because it encouraged
divorce.
The terms of the antenuptial agreement were written by a
guest9 on the reverse side of a Kethuba10 immediately preceding
the wedding of Farima and Kambiz Noghrey. The terms were:
"I, Kambiz Noghrey, agree to settle on Farima Human the house
... and $500,000 or one-half my assets, whichever is greater, in
the event of a divorce . . . ."
Farima testified at the trial that she signed the document
because she wanted protection in the event of divorce. In consideration for the agreement she assured Kambiz of her virginity
and was medically examined for that purpose. Kambiz testified
he was coerced into signing the agreement by Farima's mother
who told him there would be no wedding unless he did so. Seven
months after the wedding Farima filed for divorce.
Kambiz appealed the trial court's decision upholding the
antenuptial agreement. The court of appeal was in accord with
9. The guest happened to be an attorney whom the parties prevailed upon to write
the document just as she arrived at the wedding.
10. R B. WISCHNITZER, 6 THE UNIVERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA (1942). The Kethuba
is a marriage document which under Judaism details the rights and responsibilities of
the husband to the wife upon divorce. Under Judaic law the husband can divorce the
wife at will and therefore the Kethuba was meant to provide economic security for her.
On the other hand, by making divorce costly for the husband, the Kethuba discouraged
divorce. Should the wife choose to divorce the husband she was subject to either a reduction or complete loss of her rights.
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Kambiz that this particular agreement promoted and encouraged divorce and was thereby unenforceable as contrary to
California public policy.
The court of appeal pointed out that antenuptial agreements which merely attempt to characterize property acquired
after marriage or which seek to maintain the separate property
characteristics of property acquired before marriage, are generally binding. l l However, the Noghrey agreement encouraged
Farima to seek a divorce because divorce was the only way she
would have rights to the money and property. According to its
terms, had Kambiz died, the contract would have been nullified
and Farima would have received nothing.
In In re Marriage of Higgason12 the California Supreme
Court found that agreements which provide for a settlement
only in the event of a divorce are against public policy and consequently void. By citing a lengthy list of cases, the Noghrey
court illustrated that this rule of law has prevailed since California's early history.13

Linda C. Kramer
B.

CHILD CUSTODY

1.

The custody rights of an unmarried father who is an unemancipated minor are subordinate to the state's interest
in avoiding an environment which is detrimental to the
child.

Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218
Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985). In Michael U. v. Jamie B., the California
11. See In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1976) (parties are bound by the terms of the antenuptial agreement as long as marital
dissolution is not thereby promoted or encouraged).
12. 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 190 Cal. 522, 213 P. 993 (1923) (the policy of the
law is not to encourage divorce); Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 216 P. 92 (1923)
(courts should not sanction contracts that tend to encourage marital dissolution); Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 P. 907 (1900) (an agreement between a husband and wife
which is founded upon doing something to facilitate a divorce or to abandon a defense to
a divorce is void and illegal); Loveren v. Loveren, 106 Cal. 509, 39 P. 801 (1895) (if the
objective of a contract is the dissolution of a marriage contract, or to encourage that
result, it is a contract contra bono mores).
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Supreme Court reversed the Orange County Superior Court decision that awarded temporary custody to the father, an unmarried, unemancipated minor. Four separate opinions were issued
from a philosophically fractured court. Justice Broussard stated
in the lead opinion that the trial court abused its discretion by
holding that custody by the father would not be detrimental to
the interests of the infant.
The father (Michael) was sixteen years old at the time of
conception, and the mother (Jamie) was twelve. When Jamie informed Michael that she was pregnant, he immediately acknowledged responsibility and expressed a desire to secure custody.
Jamie, however, determined that a married couple would be
more capable of providing a satisfactory environment for the infant. She subsequently secured an adoptive couple. Michael
withheld consent to the adoption and filed a petition to establish
paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act (Act}.14 The court
awarded Michael temporary custody, but Jamie's appeal restrained Michael from securing physical custody of the infant so
as to establish his status as a legal parent with custodial rights. II>
Justice Broussard acknowledged the court had, in In re
Baby Girl M.,16 established the appropriate standard for resolving custody disputes between natural fathers and prospective
adoptive parents.The court held in Baby Girl M. that Civil Code
section 4600 mandated that no adoption could transpire without
both parents' consent, unless a court found that awarding custody to one of the parents would be detrimental to the interests
of the infant. I? The court further noted that the standard of
"best interests of the child" is applicable to custody questions
between parents, but that case law imposes an additional requirement if the custody dispute is between parent and
nonparent. 18 In In re B.G., the California Supreme Court held
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986)_
15. The Uniform Parentage Act set forth the rights of parents in the event one parent proposed adoption of the child. Id. § 7017. The Act established a hierarchy of fatherhood in which a "natural" father may be afforded fewer parental rights than a "presumed" father. Id. § 7004. The Act also provided several methods for a "natural" father
to establish "presumed" status. Id. One such method was for Michael to receive the child
into his home and to openly assert the child as his natural child. Id. § 7004(d)(4).
16. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
18. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
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that an award to a nonparent required a finding that custody by
the parent would be "detrimental to the child."l9
Justice Kaus, in his concurring opinion, expressed dismay at
the Baby Girl M. decision. Although he stated that the decision
in the instant case was "the only result which comports with justice," the decision seemed to be derived from specious logic that
"comes close to impinging upon the substantial evidence rule."20
Justice Mosk concurred with the Michael U. majority and
joined in Justice Kaus's concern over the Baby Girl M. decision.
But he also expressed concern with the limitations of the legal
arguments Justice Broussard's employed in Michael U. Justice
Mosk opined that the court's prior decision established a rule
which permitted the "casual inseminator" to thwart an unmarried mother's adoption attempt by merely withholding his consent. Justice Mosk suggested that any legal test that would
award custody to a sixteen-year-old youth, who is the biological
father and arguably a rapist, clearly established the fallacy of
any theory but the traditional one: "when there is an unmarried
mother who proposes to place her child for adoption, and a biological but not presumed father [contests], the trial court should
only consider the best interests of the child."
Justice Broussard was apparently unwilling to overrule
Baby Girl M., and maintained its "detrimental" criterion rather
than the traditional "best interests" rule. Justice Broussard asserted that the trial judge failed to utilize the existing case law
that provided the procedural analysis to be used in situations
like Michael U.21
Consequently, Justice Broussard stated that the only issue
before the court was whether the implied finding at the hearing
that custody by Michael would not be detrimental was supported by substantial evidence. The record, to Justice Broussard's satisfaction, established "uncontroverted" evidence that
19. ld. at 698, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
20. 9 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, APPEAL § 278, at 289 (3d ed. 1985).
21. In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976). First, the
facts established at the custody hearing must support the decision and second, one party
had to request the court to scrutini2e the ability of the custody·seeking parent to provide
a satisfactory environment for the child. ld.
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Michael lacked the maturity to care for a child; he had difficulty
in school, rebelled against authority, smoked marijuana and had
a history of sexual relations with females under the age of consent. The Justice also noted that the infant had been living with
the adoptive parents for some time and had established an important bond with them. 22 The court decided that a break in
that bond would be detrimental to the infant. Consequently, the
majority held that the lower court's decision was not supported
by substantial evidence.
Justice Reynoso dissented. He accused the majority of substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Justice
Reynoso stated that appellate review of a trial court ruling for
an alleged lack of substantial evidence "does not permit weighing of evidence or reversal of a judgment in accordance with the
preponderance thereof."23 He further stated that barring prejudicial error, a lower court judgment that appears to be against
the weight of the evidence should be affirmed by a reviewing tribunal unless substantial evidence supporting the trial judgment
does not exist.24 The trier of fact, he concluded, was in the best
position to establish credibility of the witnesses. 25
Justice Reynoso also faulted the majority's application of
the process established in Baby Girl M. The majority in Michael
U. held that the best interests of the child should be balanced
equally with any detriment to the child that might result if the
court awards to one of the parents. The proper application of
the Baby Girl M. rule, according to Justice Reynoso, would have
awarded custody to Michael. Under Justice Reynoso's sequential
analysis, a court would determine whether custody by the father-in and of itself-would be detrimental to the child. If custody by the father would not be detrimental, a court need not
proceed further.26 He concluded that the reasoning followed by
the majority, combined with the lengthy judicial process, effectively penalized Michael U.
22. At trial, a child psychiatrist testified that Eric (the infant) had established an
emotional attachment to the adoptive parents and would suffer learning and development difficulties if the relationship was severed.
23. 9 WITKIN, supra note 20, § 278, at 289.
24. Id. § 281, at 292.
25. Id. § 279, at 291.
26. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
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In Michael U., the California Supreme Court faced a statement of public policy from the legislature which set out the priorities and methods of awarding custody where an unmarried father contests custody by adoptive parents. The same court that
established the guidelines to support that public policy in Baby
Girl M. is understandably reticient to overrule itself. Equally
important, the court wished to avoid projecting inconsistency.
Unfortunately, the court was obliged to deal with a public
policy that appeared acceptable at inception but, in light of
Baby Girl M. and Michael U., hasn't worked. The standard set
forth in Baby Girl M. and Civil Code section 4600 requiring the
contesting party to show "detrimental" impact on the child to
avoid custody by a parent embraces too low a threshold for the
court to enforce. On the other hand, the traditional doctrine
that called for a decision in the best interest of the child, may be
too restrictive for the court to reinstate.
The dilemma of how to reconcile two contradictory standards without appearing to vacillate on the emotional issue of
child custody caused the court in Michael U. to decide the case
on procedural grounds. The construct avoided the unsatisfactory
result that would ensue from following Baby Girl M. (Michael
gets custody), and it also avoided the appearance of inconsistency which would be caused by overruling a recent precedent.
The court's refusal to overrule Baby Girl M. eliminated the opportunity to decisively reestablish the bright line rule of "in the
best interests of the child." Instead, the court found that the
trial court made a procedural error. Justice Broussard claimed
the trial decision necessarily implied that Michael's custody
would not be detrimental to the infant. He found that conclusion hard to accept in view of Michael's age and relative immaturity. Yet, as Justice Reynoso pointed out, Michael had taken
several major steps to correct his character deficiencies since the·
custody question arose. 27
The supreme court's decision in Michael U. essentially subsumes all rights of unmarried fathers to the majority of the
court's implicit belief that any radical change is detrimental to
27. Michael was interested in establishing a home for the infant with relatives and
friends as a support group. He decided to return to school; he took classes at a community college on child-rearing and he made an e~ort to find employment.
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the child. The formula the court employed will effectively terminate an unmarried father's rights as soon as the infant emotionally bonds with anyone the mother has selected for custody. The
disharmonious rules promulgated in Baby Girl M. and Michael
U. leave no clear path by which trial judges can uniformly decide cases like these. The resulting confusion at the trial level
practically mandates an appeal no matter how and what the
trial judge decides.

T.A. Graudin
2.

To terminate parental rights, there must be clear and convincing evidence that severance is the least detrimental alternative to protect the child's welfare.

In re R.B., 167 Cal. App. 3d 946, 213 Cal. Rptr. 690 (5th
Dist. 1985). In re R.B. concerned a custody dispute between a
mildly retarded mother and a couple who wished to adopt the
child. The California Court of Appeal held that before terminating the parental rights of a mildly mentally retarded mother, the
court must explore other less drastic alternatives.
Tanya S., the mildly mentally retarded mother, had a fiveyear-old son, R.S. The trial court applied California Civil Code
section 23228 and declared R.S. free from her custody and control. The court appointed Donald and Debra H., the petitioners,
as guardians.
During the first two years of R.S. 's life, Tanya was involved
with Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC) which offered a variety of supportive programs. CVRC tested R.S. and concluded
he was normal, not developmentally disabled, and was receiving
good care and attention. When R.S. was three-years old, he and
Tanya lived with Jean Gildez, a woman who exploited and
manipUlated Tanya. R.S. started preschool but after four
months the school insisted that R.S. be withdrawn primarily because he wasn't toilet trained. The teachers also described R.S.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6)(West 1982 & Supp. 1986) which provides in pertinent
part: "An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the age of
18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his parents when
[they] are ••. incapable of supporting or controlling the child ... because of .••
mental illness . . . .n ld.
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as developmentally behind students his age and immature.
Gildez convinced Tanya to give R.S. to petitioners. Tanya
signed the guardianship papers, however they were incorrectly
completed and never filed. Nonetheless the petitioners took R.S.
with them to their home in Oregon.
Tanya immediately regretted her decision to release R.S. to
the petitioners. She moved out of the home she shared with
Gildez and CVRC placed her in a program to help her develop
independent living skills. Tanya did well in the program because
she believed her success would enable her to properly care for
R.S. and get him back. Gildez once again interfered and caused
Tanya to drop out of the program.
Donald and Debra H. filed one petition to obtain guardianship of R.S. and a second petition to terminate Tanya's parental
rights. The trial court appointed the district attorney to represent R.S. and after a hearing, temporarily placed R.S. in petitioners' custody. Two-and-a-half months later the trial court
granted both petitions.
In In re Carmeleta B.,29 the California Supreme Court
stated that mentally ill persons are those who are in need of supervision, treatment, care, restraint, or who are dangerous to
themselves, to others or to the property of others. The supreme
court would not extend this definition of mental illness to facilitate the termination of parental rights, saying the strictness of
the definition acted as a safeguard to protect the primacy of the
family.
.
In In re Angelia P.,30 the supreme court held that while the
right to parent is a fundamental right it is not absolute and may
have to yield to the rights of the child. The supreme court held
that a finding to terminate parental rights under Civil Code section 232 must be supported by "clear and convincing evidence. "31 The court further held that in an action to terminate
parental rights the trial court must find that course of action to
be the least detrimental alternative for the minor.
29. 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
30. 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
31. Id. at 919, 623 P.2d at 204, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 643 (emphallis in original).
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In In re David B.,32 the court held that Civil Code section
232 was valid and did not deny a parent substantive due process
if two conditions were met: 1) the mental illness is settled and
will continue for an indefinite period of time regardless of medical treatment and 2) that severance of the parental relationship
is the least detrimental alternative available to protect the welfare of the child.
In the instant case, the trial court did not find by clear and
convincing evidence that severing the parental relationship was
the least detrimental alternative available to protect R.S. Nor
did the court establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Tanya's mental illness was such that she would not be able to
properly care for R.S. in the future. Therefore the court of appeal reversed the order to sever the parental relationship and
remanded the case for the trial court to examine further
evidence.
The custody order, which was severable from the order terminating Tanya's parental rights, was upheld because the evidence was overwhelming that at the time of the hearing Tanya
was unable to take care of R.S. by herself. 33
The court of appeal has protected the rights of both parent
and child by applying a strict standard to sever parental rights,
while at the same time allowing temporary custody by
nonparents. While the best interests of the child should be the
paramount consideration in custody battles, the rights of parents and the preservation of the family should also be
important.

Donna Cobe Beekman
32. 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979).
33. Tanya also claimed she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Although
Tanya's counsel made several omissions, Tanya did not show that but for these omission
the result of her case would have been different. Therefore counsel's failure to object to
inadmissible hearsay or his failure to assert the attorney-client privilege or his failure to
object to the appointment of the district attorney to represent R.S. did not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Tanya also claimed her attorney should have requested
a determination of her competency. The court of appeal pointed out that showing Tanya
was incompetent would have directly hurt her cause by proving she was not capable of
rearing R.S.
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In an action to terminate parental rights, the court's paramount consideration is providing a loving, stable home for
the minor.

In re Jacqueline G., 165 Cal. App. 3d 582, 211 Cal. Rptr.
827 (1st Dist. 1985). In In re Jacqueline G., the court of appeal
held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's termination of the natural father's parental rights, and
that this course was in the child's best interest.
The natural father, Manuel G., and the minor, Jacqueline
G. (Jackie) appealed from a judgment declaring Jackie free from
Manuel's custody and referring her to the Department of Social
Services for adoption. Manuel had an extensive criminal record
and history of drug involvement. He was unemployed and received supplemental sec~ity income for emotional disability.34
Manuel had not had a home of his own since Jackie's birth. Manuel's probation reports indicated he had always loved Jackie
and wanted to be with her, but that he displayed a very limited
understanding of Jackie's needs and little, if any, ability to parent effectively. Jackie's natural mother, Sally S., had relinquished the minor for adoption.
A clinical psychologist testified that Jackie felt she was part
of the adoptive S. family, derived no pleasure from visits with
her natural father, and would like to terminate the visits. The
psychologist further indicated that Jackie would feel more secure and stable if she were permanently adopted by the S.
family.
Jackie did not argue that she should be placed in Manuel's
custody but asserted that the termination of her father's parental rights would free her for adoption, thereby threatening potential inheritance rights in trusts through her natural mother.
The trusts had an actuarial value of approximately $75,000, but
Jackie's rights in them were extremely remote. 35
34. Manuel's I.Q. was between 90 and 100. He was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, acute and chronic, severe with symptomatic agitation and depression.
35. Jackie would take only if her mother and grandmother failed to exercise certain
"powers of appointment" over the principal of the trusts. Jackie could only take the
principal of the largest trust if her mother, then age 31, predeceases her grandmother,
then age 67.
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Manuel, whose primary goal was to maintain visitation
rights with Jackie, contended that the trial court erred in failing
to consider a plan for reunification. At the time of the hearing
there was no statutory mandate for the court to consider reuniting Jackie and Manuel, but the trial court did take into account Manuel's minimal efforts to establish a home. The court
found it must balance all factors which affect the minor's welfare; finances were but one aspect to consider in determining the
child's best interests. The minor's immediate need for a childhood untroubled by insecurity and anxiety outweighed the remote possibility of an inheritance. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Jackie came within the description of
the Civil Code section 23236 and that termination of parental
rights was in her best interest.
The main thrust of Jackie's appeal was that the court inadequately considered the less detrimental alternative of guardianship. A guardianship would allow Jackie to continue living with
the S. family without terminating Manuel's parental rights and
thereby perfectly preserving any potential inheritance. Manuel
joined the appeal because guardianship would enable him to
continue visitation with Jackie.
The lower court found that Jackie had been in the foster
home for more than two years. Manuel had failed and was likely
to fail in the future to provide a home for Jackie, to provide care
and control for her and to maintain an adequate parental rela36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). At the time of the hearing
in 1981, Civil Code section 232 provided, in relevant part:
(a) An action may be brought for the purpose of having any
person under the age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his parents when such
person comes within any of the following descriptions: (7)
Who has been cared for in one or more foster homes, • . •
under the supervision of the juvenile court, . . . for two or
more consecutive years, providing that the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that return of the child to his parent
or parents would be detrimental to the child and that the parent or parents . . . have failed during such period, and are
likely to fail in the future, to do the following:
(i) Provide a home for the child;
(ii) Provide care and control for the child; and
(iii) Maintain an adequate parental relationship with the
child.
ld.
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tionship with her. The court concluded that awarding custody to
Manuel would be detrimental to Jackie. The trial court further
found that termination of visitation rights and awarding custody
to the S. family was the best alternative.
The court of appeal noted that an order referring a minor
for adoption is only an interim order, a preliminary step in proceedings that mayor may not culminate in a final order for
adoption. A court hearing on the petition for adoption must follow this interlocutory order. Thus there would be additional
time before a petition of adoption was granted to explore the
parameters of Jackie's inheritance rights through Sally S.
Although the best interest of the minor should be the paramount consideration, this weighty concern should not trample
the rights of parents. Manuel was seeking to preserve visitation
rights and was not seeking custody of Jackie. Therefore the
court's focus on Manuel's parenting abilities were off point. Because the alternative of guardianship would have allowed Jackie
to live with the S. family as well as allow Manuel to visit with
his daughter, the court should have explored it with more care.

Donna Cobe Beekman
4. In custody disputes between a noncustodial parent and a
nonparent, the nonparent shall prevail if it is in the best
interests of the child.
In re Angelica M., 170 Cal. App. 3d 210, 216 Cal. Rptr. 18
(4th Dist. 1985). In In re Angelica M., the court of appeal held
that the trial court erred by applying the wrong standard in a
custody dispute.
Angelica M., a six-year-old child, appealed from a dispositional order which placed her in the custody of her father.s7 Angelica was in the legal and physical custody of her mother when
she was sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend. The mother
37. Placement with the father had several conditions. He had to 1) obtain counseling for Angelica, 2) not use alcohol to excess, 3) not use drugs in Angelica's presence, 4)
not allow Angelica in his car if he had been drinking or using drugs, and 5) Angelica was
not to be in the presence of two named individuals. According to a social worker's report
one of the persons was the father's brother-in-law who had molested Angelica.
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subsequently married the boyfriend. Angelica's father had a history of alcohol and marijuana abuse, lacked job stability, had a
minimal income and lived with his parents in an overcrowded
home. The appeal record also indicated that the father had no
consistent contact with Angelica.
Angelica was living temporarily with her maternal grandparents, doing well in school and receiving counseling. Her psychologist strongly recommended continued placement with the
maternal grandparents.
The trial court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 361(b) which provided in part:
No dependent child shall be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardians
unless, upon the hearing, the juvenile court finds
clear and convincing evidence of any of the following: . . . danger to the physical health of the
minor[,] . . . the parent. . . is unwilling to have
physical custody[,] ... severe emotional damage[,] . . . the minor has been sexually
abused . . . .38

The court of appeal held the trial court erred because the
minor was not in the physical custody of her father; section 361
only applies to taking a child from the physical custody of a parent. The court relied on In re B. G.a9 which held that Civil Code
section 4600 governs custody disputes between custodial
nonparents and noncustodial parents.40 Under section 4600, an
award of custody: 1) must be made in the best interests of the
child, 2) there must be an express finding that parental custody
would be detrimental to the minor, and 3) the findings must be
supported by evidence showing that parental custody would actually harm the child.
The trial court had awarded the father custody because it
was unable to find clear and convincing evidence of one of the
abuses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. The
trial court thought it was limited to those abuses but the court
38. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
39. In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986).
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of appeal held otherwise. While an abuse described in section
361 would satisfy the evidentiary finding of actual harm required by In re B.G., a court has discretion to explore abuses not
in the code. According to the court of appeal, the key consideration should be the best interests of the child.

Donna Cobe Beekman
C.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

1.

The doctrine of resulting trust bars one spouse from destroying the other's community property interest in military retirement benefits.

In re Marriage of Mastropaolo, 166 Cal. App. 3d 953, 213
Cal. Rptr. 26 (4th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in
In re Marriage of Mastropaolo affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding the former wife (Henriette) a community property interest in the portion of the husband's (Steven) military
disability retirement pension that would have been paid to him
as a longevity retirement benefit. The court held that the doctrine of resulting trust41 barred the husband from destroying the
wife's right to her community property share of the longevity
retirement benefits.
The parties separated in 1972, after more than nineteen
years of marriage. Three months later Steven retired from the
Air Force with a 100 % disability rating. He could have chosen to
receive longevity retirement benefits instead of disability retirement benefits because he had more than twenty years of service.
The marriage was dissolved in 1981 and two years later trial en41. See Seabury v. Costello, 209 Cal. App. 2d 640, 645, 26 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1962).
"Neither written evidence nor express declaration of trust is required •.•. A resulting
trust is implied from facts and circumstances ••. and arises by presumption of law." [d.
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (5th ed. 1979).
Trust implied in law • . . in which a party, through no actual
or constructive fraud, becomes invested with legal title. . . for
the benefit of another, although without expressed intent to
do so, because of a presumption of such intent arising by operation of law . . . . A "resulting trust" arises where a person
makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under
circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend
that person taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest therein . . . .
[d.
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sured on the property and support issues. The parties stipulated
that had Steven elected longevity retirement he would have received $117,825.56 attributable to the marriage period, at the
rate of $1,549.71 per month.
The trial court determined that Steven's prospective longevity retirement benefit was community property and awarded
Henriette a 43.65% interest.42 The court granted Steven a
56.35 % separate property interest in the optional longevity retirement benefits. The additional retirement benefits he received
included those attributable to his disability.
Steven appealed the property judgment. He claimed his
military disability retirement was separate property since it was
compensation for personal pain and suffering. The court of appeal disagreed and cited the California Supreme Court's decision
in In re Marriage of Stenquist43 and this court's decision in In
re Marriage of Mueller4 4 as controlling. Both those decisions
held that disability retirement benefits are an employee's separate property, unless he or she could also have qualified for longevity retirement benefits. The courts reasoned that allowing a
spouse to turn what would be community property into separate
property is inconsistent with the state's community property
policy of dividing assets equally.
The Mastropaolo court concluded that in circumstances
where the military spouse retires before marital dissolution and
is then eligible for either longevity or disability retirement benefits, the nonmilitary spouse has a community property interest
in those benefits.
Citing McCarty v. McCarty 45 Steven asserted that military
retirement benefits were subject to federal control only. But the
Mastropaolo court noted that Congress enacted the Federal
Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA)46 which nullified McCarty.
42. The 43.65% share excluded time prior to marriage.
43. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
44. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
45. 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (military longevity retirement pensions are subject to federal
control only and state courts may not divide them according to state laws upon marital
dissolution).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1983). In pertinent part:
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Steven argued that since FUSFSPA specifically excludes retirement disability pay,47 Congress intended to preempt state
community property law as to the disposition of those benefits.
However, the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierd0 48 stated that the correct analysis under the
supremacy clause is whether Congress specifically enacted preemption of the state law. 49 The Mastropaolo court found that
since Congress did not intend to preempt state law and no federal interests were threatened, the state court was free to apply
state law.
The court of appeal's decision is consistent with the intent
of California's community property law, that is, to preserve a
spousal interest. At the same time, this decision promotes the
congressional intent of FUSFSPA, which is to protect the
spouses of service personnel.

Linda C. Kramer
D.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

1. Income tax refunds should not be deducted from grant

checks of aid to families with dependent children.
Vaessen v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 749, 677 P.2d 1183, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (1984). In Vaessen v. Woods, the court held on a four
to three vote that income tax refunds should not be considered
income when calculating aid to families with dependent children
(AFDC).ISO The California Department of Social Services
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat
disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely
of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.
[d.

47. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1983). Disposable retired or retainer pay is defined as:
"the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled . . • less
amounts which . . . are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or
retainer pay of such member, including ... amounts waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 ...•" [d. § 1408(a)(4)(B).
48. 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (benefits payable under the Railroad Retirement Act of
1974 may not be divided under state community property law).
49. [d.

50. AFDC was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615
(1983 & Supp. 1985). It is jointly funded by the federal government and the states and is
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promulgated a regulation which treated income tax refunds as
"income"-thereby reducing the grant of aid to AFDC families
by the amount of the refund. Families whose aid was cut
brought a class action to enjoin the state from enforcing this regulation. Plaintiffs were recipients who had been employed long
enough in a given year to accrue some withholdings, but who
had not attained self-sufficiency above the minimum standard of
need. 51
Neither Congress nor the California Legislature had defined
"resource" or "income." However, the terms do serve as conclusive labels. If a tax refund is labeled income, then the amount of
the refund is deducted from a future AFDC grant. 52 But if a tax
refund is labeled a resource the recipient may retain the refund
without a grant reduction. 53
The court found three policy reasons why tax refunds
should be considered resources. First, families need a steady
source of income to meet their basic recurring needs and obtain
economic security. Second, treating tax refunds as resources will
provide incentive for employment. Reducing future grants
brings about an economic hardship which may cause recipients
to feel penalized for working and thereby discourage future employment. Third, the cost of the paperwork required to adjust
monthly grants would most likely outweigh any fiscal savings the
state could expect since the average refund is usually only about
$130.
administered by the states in a scheme of cooperative federalism. While state participation is elective, federal funding is conditioned on program compliance with the Social
Security Act and applicable federal regulations.
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11452 (West Supp. 1986) defines the minimum standard of adequate as $424 per month for a family of two, $526 for a family of three, $625
for a family of four and $1130 for a family of ten or more. Id.
52. Two months after a recipient receives his or her income tax refund the department deducts it from the next grant check. Because the normal monthly grant is so small
recipients often use the tax refund to pay for daily necessities. The court noted that it is
not realistic to assume that recipients can save the refund for needed expenses two
months down the road.
53. Current federal law allows a family to retain resources with a combined equity
value of less than $1000, plus the home it owns and occupies, plus an automobile with
equity value of less than $1,500, plus essential household and personal goods. A state
may specify lower limits on resources. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 1985); 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a)(i)(B) (1985). California permits recipients to retain the maximum resources
permitted by federal law. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11155,11257 (West 1980 & Supp.
1986).
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The court relied on the following federal regulation: "In establishing financial eligibility in the amount of the assistance
payment, only such net income as is actually available . . . on a
regular basis will be considered."54 The court held that since income tax refunds are usually only given once a year if at all, they
are not received on a regular basis and therefore must be a resource. However, prior to this case, Congress deleted the phrase
"on a regular basis" from the regulations. 55 While the words "on
a regular basis" no longer appeared in the regulations the court
held that treating tax refunds as resources furthered the federal
policy of insuring that needy children will receive a minimally
adequate level of care and support.
The court compared AFDC grants to the federal food stamp
program which specified that income tax refunds be treated as
resources for the policy reasons discussed previously. The majority found that treating tax refunds as resources rather than income would not, as the state asserted, result in unwarranted
windfalls allowing persons with substantial financial resources to
remain on welfare. If a family has too many resources, it becomes ineligible for public assistance. 56
While the majority found that its decision would carry out
federal policy, the dissent criticized the court for overstepping
its founds. The dissent argued that the court's sole function was
to find whether the state regulation conflicted with applicable
federal statutes, not whether a different policy (treating tax refunds as resources) was consistent with the federal regulations.
The dissent also argued that an agency needs flexibility
when it implements a statutory scheme. If the agency's first attempt at effectuating a statute doesn't work, it should be able to
try another method. The dissent found that the effect of the majority's holding is to restrict an agency to its initial approach
unless the legislature expressly approves an alternative method.
54. Former 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (a)(1)(1979) (emphasis added).
55. In his dissent, Justice Richardson accused the majority of not considering the
intent of Congress when it deleted "on a regular basis" from the statute. Several court
decisions had relied on those words in holding that tax refunds were not to be counted as
income. Justice Richardson found that despite Congressional action to the contrary, the
majority continued to intuit a federal intention to require regularity.
56. See supra note 53 for relevant discussion.
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The majority was correct in its decision to treat tax refunds
as a resource. The regulation offered only minimal savings to the
state and clearly would cause hardship to AFDC families who
struggle to survive on limited grants. A court has the power to
examine a regulation to see if it is rationally related to the ends
it is supposed to achieve. However, because the amount of
money available for public welfare is not limitless, courts should
tred carefully when their decisions reallocate these funds. While
the fiscal loss to the state as a result of this decision, if any, is
minimal, the distribution of welfare is the responsibility of
elected representatives and not courts.

Donna Cobe Beekman
II. CRIMINAL LAW

A.

EVIDENCE

1. A mother's testimony of her young child's out-of-court

statement does not violate the hearsay rule or the confrontation clause.
In re Damon H., 165 Cal. App. 3d 471, 211 Cal. Rptr. 623
(3rd Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal in In re Damon
H. affirmed the juvenile court's finding that a sexual molestation
offense was committed against a child as well as affirming that it
was proper to admit evidence under the spontaneous declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. l >7 Furthermore, such an admission
did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation. 58
The evidence admitted was the testimony of a child sexual
molestation victim's mother. She testified that her son, Colby,
told her what happened shortly after the offense occurred.
It was stipulated at the jurisdictional hearing that Colby, a
two-year, nine-month-old child, was incompetent to testify. His
mother testified that Colby went on a bike ride with his four57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1966). "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement ... [p]urports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and ... [w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such
perception." ld.
5S. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." ld.
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year-old brother in the care of his neighbors, Damon and
Vance.c;g Upon returning home Colby was crying and Vance
claimed the child had fallen. Colby's mother asked him what
had happened and the child denied falling. The child then voluntarily declared his buttocks hurt and that "Damon put his
weenie in my butt."
In determining whether Colby'S statement was admissible
the court found that even if he was too young to testify, Evidence Code section 1240 allowed admission of a spontaneous
declaration when there was sufficient evidence to support the reliability of such a statement. The court looked at the similar circumstances in People v. Orduno. 60 A three-year-old child was
molested in Orduno and in response to her mother's questioning
she stated what had happened. Because the child was incompetent to testify herself, the mother testified as to the out-of-court
statement. The Orduno court found the statement to be spontaneous. It also noted that spontaneity is a recognized indicia of
reliability that weighs against any violation of the confrontation
clause. 61
Colby made his hearsay declaration within ten minutes of
returning home from a forty-minute bike ride. Neither the lapse
of time between the relevant event and the statement, nor the
fact that it was elicited by his mother's questioning, deprived it
of its spontaneous character. The court of appeal was satisfied
with the trial court's finding that Colby was in a state of extreme excitement for the entire period of time and was therefore
able to remember accurately and communicate what had occurred. The fact that the child's mother offered the testimony
did not deprive the statement of its trustworthiness.
The defendant argued that even if Colby's statement met
the criteria for a hearsay exception its admission violated his
constitutional right to confront his accuser.62 The court of appeal disagreed by saying the confrontation clause did not confer
an absolute right of confrontation, and further, that a California
court had never proposed that admitting a spontaneous de clara59. Damon was fourteen years old and his brother Vance was twelve years old.
60. 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978).
61. [d. at 747, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra note 58 for relevant language.
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tion is a per se violation of the confrontation clause. 63
In dealing with the task of reconciling the hearsay exception
rule with the confrontation clause, the court relied on Ohio v.
Roberts64 and held that if the evidence lies within a well established hearsay exception then it is presumed to be trustworthy.
The "statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability.''' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. "65
To further ensure the reliability of Colby's spontaneous declaration, the court applied the four part test enumerated in the
plurality opinion of Dutton v. Evans. 66 Colby's explicit and immediate description of the assault was an express assertion of
the past event and made it unlikely that it was the result of
faulty recollection. Damon's own testimony was independent ev:idence that Colby was under his care during the bike ride and
supported the fact that Colby was able to acquire first-hand
knowledge of the events referred to within the statement. As
further indicia of the reliability of Colby's statement, the court
noted Colby had no experience with sexual conduct prior to this
event.
The court's decision to admit the mother's testimony is important because it will typically be a parent to whom a young
child victim relates any sexual assault. Since a young child will
often be deemed incompetent to testify, this court's findings affect the future admission of hearsay evidence as well as the conviction of child molesters. In applying the criteria enumerated in
Dutton the court affirmed that a young child's spontaneous declaration is reliable and consequently tips the balance against any
63. Upon objection it would be impossible to exclude every statement made by a
declarant not present at trial; for example, dying declarations are admissible. See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1966) (dying declarations are admissible).
64. 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (admission of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing
testimony does not violate the defendant's right to confrontation if it bears sufficiently
reliable criteria).
65. [d. at 66.
66. 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970). The factors to test reliability are: (1) if the hearsay
statement included an express assertion of a past event, (2) if independent evidence supported the declarant's personal knowledge of the subject matter of the statement, (3) if
there was a substantial possibility of faulty memory on the part of the declarant and (4)
if the circumstances under which the statement was made indicate its reliability. [d.
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constitutional violation of the confrontation clause.

Linda C. Kramer
B.
1.

SENTENCING

Before a defendant is sentenced to consecutive terms for
multiple counts of oral copulation, a jury must specifically
find he used force or threats.

People v. Riffey, 171 Cal. App. 3d 419, 217 Cal. Rptr. 319
(3rd Dist. 1985). In People v. Riffey, the California Court of
Appeal held that in order to implement Penal Code section
667.6(c),67 which imposes full consecutive sentences for certain
sex crimes, the jury must find that a defendant's conduct falls
within its express provisions. Further, the court held that the
jury must be instructed to specifically and positively declare
which elements of the sex crimes defendant committed. If the
jury determines defendant used threats or fear, it must also decide whether the degree of threat or fear rose to the level of
great bodily harm.
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping,68 assault with a
deadly weapon,69 two counts of forcible rape,70 and three counts
of forcible oral copulation.71 He was sentenced to a prison term
of forty-five years. The trial court's sentence included the imposition of separate, consecutive prison terms for each of defendant's three oral copulation convictions. The trial court cited section 667.6 (c) as authority for ordering consecutive terms.
Defendant's central challenge to the validity of his sentence
was predicated on the ground that the trial court improperly resorted to section 667.6 (c) as authority for the consecutive terms
it imposed. Defendant argued that there is a difference between
the statutory definition of oral copulation,72 upon which the jury
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West Supp. 1986) which states, in pertinent part:
"[A] full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation ... of committing . . . oral copulation by force . . . or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury." [d.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West 1970 & Supp. 1986).
72. [d. Section 288a(c) provides that a person found guilty of oral copulation in conjunction with "force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
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based its verdict, and the language of section 667.6(c),73 upon
which the trial court based its sentence.
The court of appeal agreed with defendant and held that
there was a basic difference between the definition of oral copulation in Penal Code section 288a and section 667.6(c). The
court stated that under the section 288a(c), the degree of threat
required for a conviction is based on a subjective standard. The
victim need only fear bodily injury. However, for sentence enhancement under section 667.6(c), the degree of threat required
for a conviction is based upon a more rigorous objective
standard.
The court concluded that the consecutive sentencing allowed under section 667.6(c) could not be invoked since it was
unclear from the jury's general verdict whether it had determined that defendant's act of forcible copulation was accomplished by force or threat. Moreover, if it were by threat, there
existed the further uncertainty of the degree of threat. Thus, the
court declared that absent a specific finding by the jury of a
threat that reached the level of great bodily injury, the trial
court could not impose full consecutive sentences pursuant to
section 667.6(c).

Kathy A. Alfieri
C.

SEX OFFENSES

1.

A woman raped by a former lover is entitled to benefits
under the Victims of Violent Crimes Act regardless of
whether criminal prosecution occurs.

Anne B. v. State Board of Control, 165 Cal. App. 3d 279,
209 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1st Dist. 1984). In Anne B. v. State Board of
Control, appellant Anne B. brought an action to compel the
State Board of Control (Board) to grant her claim for benefits
under the Victims of Violent Crimes Act. 74 The Board had
denied her claim of $4,140 for psychological rehabilitation
injury on the victim or another person •.. shall be punished by imprisonment . . . ."
ld.
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West Supp. 1986).
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
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necessitated by a violent rape perpetrated by a former lover.
The Board rejected her claim because of her on-off relationship
with the alleged rapist and because the district attorney had declined to prosecute the matter, primarily due to that
relationship.
The Board determined that Anne B. had not met the Act's
requirement of proof of a violent crime because the district attorney had declined to file charges against the alleged assailant. 75 The Board was swayed neither by a police report that
pointed to specific medical evidence of trauma suffered by Anne
B., nor by a letter from her therapist that indicated his belief in
the victim's traumatic injuries.
In addition to these facts, uncontested testimony at trial
showed that an employee of the Contra Costa Victim/Witness
Assistance Program (Program) approached Anne B. and that the
employee and the Program were authorized by statute to counsel victims of crimes and to assist them in preparing and
presenting claims under the Act.76 Additional testimony indicated that Anne B. also relied upon assurances of the availability of state funds to cover the costs of therapy. Both the Program employee and the therapist who subsequently treated her
offered those warranties and assurances. The Anne B. court held
that appellant justifiably relied upon the representations of the
Program employee who assured her of compensation for the
psychotherapy.
The court of appeal held, contrary to the trial court, that
the intent of the Victim of Violent Crimes Act is to assist a victim's rehabilitation" and that denial of benefits must be based
upon narrowly construed grounds.7s The court further held that
75. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) which defines a crime
of violence as "a crime or public offense ... which results in injury to a resident of this
state . . . ." Id.
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13835(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) states the legislative
intent of the WitnessNictim Assistance Act insofar as "a large number of victims . . .
are unaware of ..• their rights . . . ." Id.
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13959 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) which states: "It is in the
public interest to indemnify and assist in the rehabilitation of suffer a pecuniary loss
which they are unable to recoup without suffering serious financial hardship." Id.
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13964 (West Supp. 1986). This section of the Act was added
after the Anne B. assault, but before the case came before the court of appeal. The
justices noted that although legislation is rarely meant to be retroactively applied, when
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the Board, not the district attorney, decides whether a violent
act occurred.
The court found repugnant the Board's argument that Anne
B.'s on-off relationship with her attacker implicated her as a
participant in the events leading to the assault. The court renounced this as a thinly disguised version of "she asked for it."
The court found the relationship to be irrelevant as to legitimizing or diminishing the impact upon the victim of forced sexual
intercourse. The court went on to state that while a district attorney may have to weigh the relationship's impact upon a jury'
which may retain an outmoded way of thinking about rape, the
State of California would not be a party to outdated sexual
mores. 79
Generally a court extends considerable support to the decision of an administrative body such as the Board. However, a
court may issue a writ of mandamus when a party alleges that
the administrative body prejudicially abused its discretion. so In
Anne B., the appellant argued that the Board's decision was not
"supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record"
as required by California Code of Civil Procedure.sl The court
agreed. The court concluded that the evidence-the police report and the therapist's statement-in conjunction with the
wording of the Act's provisions, definitions and intent, clearly
pointed to the appellant as a victim of a violent crime.
The Anne B. decision demonstrates the court's interest in
vigorously and assidiously enforcing the legislative intent of the
the purpose of the legislation is solely to impart a clearer understanding of the intent
behind earlier legislation, retroactive application is warranted.
Subdivision (d) states that U[n]o application shall be denied solely because no criminal complaint has been filed, unless the complaint has not been filed for one of the reasons stated in subdivision (b) and (c)." [d. § 13964(d).
Subdivision (b) permits denial if the applicant's involvement in the events leading
up to the crime is of a questionable nature. [d. § 13964(b).
Subdivision (c) permits denial of the application if (1) applicant willingly participated in the crime or (2) the applicant failed to cooperate with the law enforcement
agency investigating the crime. [d. § 13964(c).
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) (West Supp. 1986) which states in pertinent part that U[a]ny person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or ... upon
any person resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony . . . ." [d.
80. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
81. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
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Victim of Violent Crimes Act. The purpose of the legislation is
to compensate the victim of a violent act, rather than be an adjunct or facilitator to the state's quest for conviction of the assailant. With compensation as a focus of the Victim of Violent
Crimes Act, the often pivotal issue of the victim/attacker relationship in a criminal prosecution context, is irrelevant in the
civil matter of determining benefits for the victim. The court of
appeal has made a strong attempt to update the thinking of its
administrative counterparts.

T.A. Graudin
2. A child molester may not exploit a technicality in order to
avoid registering as a sex offender.
People v. Tate, 164 Cal. App. 3d 133, 210 Cal. Rptr. 117
(5th Dist. 1985). The California Court of Appeal held in People
v. Tate that the state has a strong policy of requiring anyone
who molests or annoys children to register as a sex offender.
Thus the trial court erred in not requiring such registration.
The victim was the seven-year-old daughter of Tate's girl
friend. The child told a social worker that Tate sexually molested her for several months and finally had sexual intercourse
with her. She reiterated these events during cross examination
in a preliminary hearing. Tate denied the allegations and the
child later disaffirmed the acts in a taped statement. In addition
there was disagreement among doctors as to whether the child
was in fact molested. Because of the conflicting testimony the
district attorney accepted Tate's plea bargain of nolo contendere
to violating Penal Code section 647a.S2
At the time of this offense the California Penal Code had an
express requirement that anyone convicted of violating subdivision 1 of section 647a must register as a sex offender. s3 That requirement was enacted in 1947 and applied to certain sections,
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647a (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). In pertinent part: "Every
person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punishable ..• by a fine ... or by imprisonment ... or by both •..." Id.
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1970). In pertinent part: "Any person who ...
has been or is ... convicted in the State of California shall ... register [as a sex offender1with the chief of police of the city in which he resides or the sheriff of the county
if he resides in an unincorporated area." Id.
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including section 647a, which then consisted of two subdivisions.
Subdivision 1 pertained to the annoyance or molestation of children and subdivision 2 concerned loitering near schools-and
public places where children are present.
A discrepancy occurred when the legislature subsequently
modified section 647 by deleting subdivision 2. The 1986 version
of the statute had no subdivision 1, yet the registration requirement of section 290 still referred to subdivision 1. The legislature had neglected to conform section 290 with the new section
647a.
Tate argued that because section 647a had no subdivision 1
when he committed the offense it was unclear whether the Legislature intended to have the registration requirement apply to
section 647a. The court concluded his argument had no merit
and that the legislature's failure to bring the two statutes in conformity with one another was a mere oversight. A court cannot
allow a legislative act to be proclaimed invalid because of uncertainty when the statute can be clarified by simply correcting the
inadvertent error. S4
People v. Mills s5 was controlling for this court. The defendant in Mills was required to register as a sex offender upon conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct on a seven-year-old
child. The court in Mills concluded that when someone attempts
sexual penetration of a minor it was not shocking or unusual to
require registration as a sex offender.
The court of appeal explained that one who is convicted
under 647a is motivated by an unnatural and abnormal sexual
interest of children.s6 The objective of section 647a is to protect
children from sex offenders and to facilitate the segregation and
apprehension of such criminals. Since this statute did not prescribe a penalty out of proportion to the offense, the Tate court
chose not to interfere with a matter it felt to be within the legis84. "For example, if a supplemental or amendatory statute refers to a section of the
original act by number, and the section referred to is not in harmony with the legislative
purpose whereas only one other section is, the reference will be treated as being to the
other section." 58 CAL. JUR. 3n Statutes § 113 (1980).
85. 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1978).
86. See People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App. 2d Supp 895, 900, 246 P. 2d 173 (1952).
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lative province.
The court was correct in observing that children require society's utmost protection. This decision upheld the legislative
purpose of guaranteeing that known child molesters be available
for constant police observation.

T.A. Graudin
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A.
1.

EDUCATION

The rule denying reimbursement to parents who unilaterally place their handicapped child in a private educational facility is subject to exception in cases of bad faith.

In re John K., 170 Cal. App. 3d 783, 216 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1st
Dist. 1985). In In re John K., the California Court of Appeal
held that the well-established rule denying reimbursement to
parents who unilaterally place a handicapped child in a private
educational facility is subject to exception. The exception applies where a school district has acted in bad faith by flagrantly
failing to comply with the procedural requirements enumerated
in the Education of the Handicapped Act (Act).87 This exception
entitles the parents to reimbursement. The court further held
that the parents were entitled to attorney's fees. California law
authorizes such fees where a public entity's conduct is arbitrary
or capricious. 88
John K. was classified as learning disabled and educationally handicapped at an early age. In 1976, an Individual Education Program (IEP) was established for him and he progressed
fairly well. In 1977, John K. was placed in a public high school
where he developed chronic patterns of truancy and severe behavioral problems. The school district was fully aware of John
K.'s severe behavioral disorders for more than two years, but it
took no remedial measures. Between October 1978 and April
87. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1461 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 800 (West 1980) provides in pertinent part that "where the
award, finding or other determination of such proceeding was the result of arbitrary or
capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof in his official capacity, the complainant ... may collect reasonable attorney's fees . . . ." Id.
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1979, John K. spent considerable time in juvenile hall and residential facilities. During this time the school district neither reassessed John K.'s placement nor developed an appropriate IEP
for him. John K.'s parents then placed him in a private residential facility.
Plaintiffs, John K.'s parents, contended that fiscal responsibility for John K.'s residential placement rested with the school
district. Plaintiffs based their contention on the well-settled legal principle that if private placement is needed in order to provide a handicapped child with an appropriate education, it shall
be provided at no cost to the child's parents. S9
Defendant school district acknowledged its duty to pay for
appropriate, agreed-upon placement of a handicapped child.
However, it asserted that unilateral placement by John K.'s parents, which was not done pursuant to an IEP, negated any claim
for reimbursement of private educational costs.
Defendant's assertion was based upon the "stay put" requirement90 of the Act which states that the student must remain in her present educational placement during the pendency
of any proceeding conducted under the Act. Violation of the
"stay put" requirement imposes the cost of the private education upon the parents. 91
Plaintiffs contended that the "stay put" provision was ineffectual when John K. was placed at the private facility (peS)
because neither a hearing nor a due process proceeding was
pending. Plaintiffs further argued that only formal initiation of
due process hearing procedures triggered the "stay put" requirement, and since there was no formal initiation the provision was
inapplicable. However, the court agreed with the defendants and
found that the "stay put" requirement was applicable during the
89. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1985).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(3) (1978). The "stay put" requirement directs that, "during
the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or
local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall
remain in the then current educational placement of such child ••.." [d.
91. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403 (1985) provides: "If a handicapped child has available a free
appropriate public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private
school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for the child's
education at the private school or facility." [d.
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pendency of any proceeding pursuant to the Act, not only the
due process hearing provisions. 92
Section 1415(b)(1) of the Act also enumerates parental prehearing rights such as records examination and participation in
placement decisions.93 When John was placed at PCS by his parents, proceedings detailed in section 1415 were pending because
he had an e?,isting IEP and a public school placement. The court
rejected plaintiffs' formal initiation argument by stating that if
such a rule was adopted, the statute's objective, which is to
maintain the status quo during placement disputes, would be
unfairly compromised. Thus, despite the fact that neither a formal complaint nor a due process hearing had begun, the court
found that the "stay put" requirement in the Act was in effect
when John was unilaterally placed at PCS.
The court noted however, that the "stay put" requirement
need not be construed as an absolute bar to all retroactive tuition payments. It held that justice may compel the sanction of
self-help in certain factual situations where all other avenues
have been exhausted. The court listed factors such as the efficacy of the existing IEP and the reasonableness of the parties'
actions as considerations that need to be taken in to account.
In assessing whether the sanction of self-help was compelled
in this case, the court stated that John's placement in public
school had become entirely and obviously inappropriate as evidenced by his truancy patterns and troublemaking activities.
Further, the school district was fully aware of John's severe behavioral disorders for more than two full years and it did not
respond to his clear need for a placement change. During this
period, the school district failed to reassess John's placement
and failed to devise an appropriate IEP for him. This failure to
reassess John's placement clearly violated the Act, which requires annual review of IEPs.94 The court felt that under these
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(3),(c),(d),(e) (1978). The court noted that the "stay put"
requirement according to statute is applicable, during the pendency of any proceedings
conducted pursuant to this section. The court also noted that this section enumerates
not only due process hearing provisions but also pre-hearing rights of parents such as,
right to examination of records, notice of placement change and participation in their
child's placement decisions.
93. Id. § 1415 (b)(l).
94. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (1985).
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exceptional circumstances, justice compelled the sanction of selfhelp considering the inefficacy of the existing IEP and the unreasonableness of defendant's inaction. The court asserted that
defendant's bad faith, as evidenced by its inaction, coupled with
plainly inappropriate placement, justified unilateral placement
by John K's parents.
The dissent argued that because the school district conducted numerous consultations with John's parents, it did not
act in bad faith. The dissent did not disagree with the majority's
inception of equitable considerations.
The court awarded the parents attorney's fees under California law95 which authorizes such fees when a public entity has
conducted itself in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The court
held that the school district's failure to reassess John's IEP and
its general inaction in the face of an entirely inappropriate
placement, constituted arbitrary and capricious action because
its conduct was unsupported by a fair or substantial reason.

In re John K. carves out a somewhat subjective exception to
the "stay put" requirement of the Education of the Handicapped Act. Although reimbursement to John's parents was
clearly warranted in light of the exigencies of this particular
case, due process hearings were available to John's parents to
challenge his placement, yet these were not used.
Kathy A. Alfieri
B.
1.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A four year delay in filing sexual harassment charges
against a state university professor was held unreasonable
and prejudicial.

Brown v. State Personnel Board, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1151, 213
Cal. Rptr. 53 (3rd Dist. 1985). In Brown v. State Personnel
Board, the court of appeal reversed the State Personnel Board's
(Board) decision to dismiss appellant Brown for sexually harassing female students. The court of appeal ordered him reinstated
as a tenured professor at California State University at Sacra95. See supra note 88 for relevant language.
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mento (CSUS).
In 1981 the Board charged Brown with unprofessional conduct and with failure to perform the duties of his office. 9s
Charges included five separate instances of alleged misconduct
which the Board termed "a series and pattern of sexual harassment of female students. "97
At the outset of the hearing the Board determined that two
charges of immoral conduct were baseless. Two of the remaining
three charges involved incidents which allegedly occurred in
1975. Brown moved to dismiss these two charges on the basis of
either the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of
laches. Brown argued that California Government Code section
1963598 which established a three year statute of limitations on
harassment charges against a state employee precluded any
complaint.99
The Brown court rejected the argument on the basis that
the statute of limitations in the government code did not apply
to violations of the education code. But the court determined
that section 19635, while not directly applicable in Brown's situation, nevertheless indicated "a legislative policy that a delay of
three years is inherently unreasonable in the prosecution of a
disciplinary action."
The court combined that conclusion with Brown's alternate
argument that the doctrine of laches controlled. loo The court acknowledged that the doctrine of laches had been applied to
96. CAL. Enuc. ConE § 89535(b}, (f) (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) states that U[a]ny
permanent or probationary employee may be dismissed. . . for the following causes:. . .
[u]nprofessional conduct ... [or] ... [fJailure or refusal to perform the normal and
reasonable duties of the position." Id.
97. The alleged incidents were similar. Brown would allegedly comment on the student's attractiveness, indicate an interest in having sex with her, and then attempt to
embrace and/or kiss the student. The usual locale of these alleged incidents was Brown's
office on campus.
98. CAL. GOV'T ConE § 19635 (West 1980) states that U[n]o punitive action shall be
valid against any state employee for any cause for discipline based on any civil service
law of this State, unless notice of such punitive action is served within three years after
the cause for discipline ... first arose . . . ." Id.
99.Id.
100. 7 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 5239-40 (8th ed. 1974). Laches is the
equitable equivalent to the statute of limitations, insofar as it is bars equitable relief in
civil actions. I d.
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quasi-adjudicative proceedings where defendant moved to dismiss charges on the grounds that the action had not been diligently pursued. 101 Brown had moved to dismiss the 1975 charges
at the board hearing, arguing that a lapse of four years from the
time the events allegedly occurred to the time charges were filed
was itself proof that CSUS !IDd the Board had failed to "diligently proceed." The Board rejected the motion and the court
reversed.
The court relied upon uncontested evidence that CSUS had
knowledge of the 1975 incidents before Brown was granted tenure in 1976. The female students involved in these alleged incidents were apparently reluctant to formally complain. Their inaction, combined with CSUS policies that required a written
complaint prior to the commencement of any disciplinary procedure, effectively halted any action against Brown. The court
noted that the reticence of the students "may be of interest in
the exercise of deciding to prosecute or not prosecute," but that
a charge of sexual harassment did not concern the rights of the
student but rather the duty of CSUS to deter misconduct with
punishment.
The court posited that any unreasonable delay in the disciplinary process caused by deference to an alleged victim's reluctance to testify effectively and unfairly lets the employee "twist
slowly in the wind." Although CSUS had a "practice" not to act
without a written complaint, the Brown court said, "[A] self-imposed constraint is no more justification because it is delineated
a practice than it if is discretion."
In addition to showing unreasonable delay, a defendant invoking the doctrine of laches must show prejudice to his case
directly attributable to the delay.lo2 The appellate court found,
contrary to the Board and trial court, that Brown was
101. Steen v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 542, 190 P.2d 937 (1948). A municipal
employee discharged for cause was reinstated by the California Supreme Court. The
court reasoned that the delay of an administrative hearing beyond the time limit set by
city charter was prejudicial to Steen as a matter of law. [d.
102. Conti v. Board of Commissioners, 1 Cal. 3d. 351,461 P.2d 617, 82 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1969). Conti had been criminally charged with bookmaking. His employer discharged him when it learned of the charges. The court held that the extreme delay (more
than three years between discharge and the case being heard by the appellate court) in
resolving the validity of the discharge prejudiced Conti's ability to defend himself. [d.
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prejudiced by the unreasonable delay because he had removed
himself from alternative tenure-track employment opportunities
from 1975 to 1981. The court reasoned that Brown was
prejudiced by his reliance on the continuation of his tenured
position.
The Brown court determined that the doctrine of laches defeated all but one of the charges. The remaining charge, stemming from a 1979 incident, could not by itself sustain the CSUS
complaint alleging "a series and a pattern of sexual harrassment." The court stated that Brown did not need to defend
against each individual count in the complaint, but only needed
to refute a sufficient number to invalidate the "series and pattern" charge against him.
The decision of the Brown court illustrates the extent an
appellate court can arbitrarily alter the weight of evidence
presented at trial in order to neg~te the lower court decision.
The court placed great reliance on the similarity of purpose between the laches doctrine and the statute of limitations to
thwart an injustice worked by a dimming of memories. But evidence presented both at the Board hearing and at trial indicated
the witnesses' memories were not dimmed by the passage of
time. The court avoided discussing the apparent contradiction.
The court concluded that Brown was prejudiced by his foregoing alternate employment opportunities. However, if CSUS
had been prompt in handling the matter, Brown would have had
those four years to seek employment-with the stigma of discharge for sexual harassment. The latter seems more prejudicial.
The reticence of the court to sustain a charge of sexual harassment should be sufficient notice to the legislature to amend
the laches/statute of limitations parameters. A "reasonable delay
under the circumstances" approach may provide a more equitable solution than an absolute maximum period applicable in all
instances.

T.A. Graudin
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IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

A.
1.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Black women are a cognizable group for the purpose of
showing discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in
jury selection.

People v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 704 P.2d 176, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 416 (1985). In People v. Motton, the California Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's ruling that defense counsel did
not meet each of the requirements enunciated in People v.
Wheeler 103 for a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion.
The trial court also failed to order the prosecutor to justify his
challenges. The supreme court further held that black women
are a cognizable group and that the prosecutor used a disproportionate number of challenges to exclude black women from the
jury.
During jury selection for defendant's second degree murder
trial, defense counsel objected strenuously that the prosecutor
was exercising his peremptory challenges to exclude black·
women from the jury, and subsequently objected that the prosecutor was excluding blacks generally. The voir dire judge rejected counsel's argument and denied his Wheeler objection. Defendant renewed his objection at trial but the trial judge
overruled it on the ground that voir dire judge had previously
denied it.
Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court had
committed reversible error per se in ruling that defendant had
not presented a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion.
~he California Supreme Court found that defendant's contention placed in issue the three elements of a prima facie case of
group bias: adequacy of the record, exclusion of a cognizable
group, and the strong likelihood that persons were challenged
103. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 503 P. 2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The Wheeler court
recognized the inherent danger of peremptory challenges being used to violate defendant's right to a representative jury. The Wheeler court stated that in order to challenge
the use of peremptories to remove jurors on the sole ground of group bias, objecting
counsel must set forth a prima facie showing of discrimination. Opposing counsel must
then justify her challenges. Id.
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because of their membership in the group.l04
The court held the record in this case to be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory exclusion. The
record stated that by the time jury selection was completed,
seven out of thirteen of the prosecutor's challenges had been directed against blacks, five of them were black women. This left
no blacks on the jury as finally selected.
The court stated that several different factors and considerations came into play when assessing whether or not a group is
"cognizable." There must be factors which define and limit the
group, such as race and/or gender. There must also be a common
denominator in the group which promotes a basic similarity in
attitudes, ideas or experiences. The court stated that black
women share a common perspective arising from their life experiences which is a direct result of the concurrence of racial and
sexual discrimination. Therefore, the court held that black
women are members of a cognizable group within Wheeler
requirements. 1011
The Wheeler court suggested several methods of supporting
a prima facie showing of group bias. l06 However, the Motton
court applied only one of the Wheeler methods in analyzing
whether the jurors were challenges because of their membership
in a cognizable group. The court adopted the strict numbers approach to this question, stating that the moving party should
show that either her opponent has struck most or all of the
members of a cognizable group, or has used a disproportionate
number of challenges against the group. In Motton, the prosecutor directed seven of thirteen challenges to remove black jurors.
That high number persuaded the court that the prosecutor had
used a disproportionate number of challenges to exclude all
104. Id. at 258-80, 583 P.2d at 748-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890-905.
105. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
106. Id. Wheeler suggested three methods of analyzing whether those challenged
were excluded because of their membership in a cognizable group: (1) moving party to
show that the only thing the challenged jurors have in common is group membership; (2)
moving party to show that the challenging party failed to engage jurors in more than a
perfunctory voir dire-which would show challenging party's previous plan to exclude
those jurors; (3) moving party to show that defendant is a member of the challenged
group and the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of the chosen jurors
belong.ld.
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blacks from the jury.
Although this decision purports to be an extension of the
Wheeler rationale, on closer inspection it is simply an outline of
a model application of the Wheeler elements for a prima facie
showing of group bias. The court's painstakingly careful analysis
and its scolding tone throughout the opinion when addressing
the voir dire judge's mistakes were evidence of this intent. Motton may be seen as a blueprint for voir dire which clarifies the
proper application of Wheeler.

Kathy A. Alfieri
2.

Penal Code section 273.5 prohibiting corporal abuse of
spouses or cohabiting partners does not violate the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution.

People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 944, 217 Cal. Rptr.
616 (2nd Dist. 1985). In People v. Gutierrez, the California
Court of Appeal held that Penal Code section 273.5,107 which imposes a criminal penalty for the willful and unlawful infliction of
corporal injury by one spouse upon the other, resulting in a
traumatic condition, does not violate the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution. lOS
Defendant was convicted by a jury under section 273.5 for
severely beating his wife. His sentence was enhanced because of
prior convictions. l09
Defendant contended on appeal that section 273.5 denied
him equal protection of the law because it discriminated unfairly
against married and cohabitating partners. Defend~t based his
assertion on the fact that the statute applies to only married and
meretricious cohabitating relationships as its class of potential
offenders, excluding divorcees and separated meretricious part107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1986). The court further held that cohabitation is not an element of the offense, the jury instructions defining traumatic condition is valid, and the trial court properly sustained defendant's prior convictions.
108. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. "A person may not be .•. denied equal protection of
the laws." Id.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). "Any person convicted of a
serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive
... a [sentence] enhancement . . . ." Id.
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ners. Defendant concluded that since persons in the excluded
categories who engage in spousal violence cannot be found guilty
of a section 273.5 violation, the statute violated the equal protection clause. llo
The court agreed with defendant's assessment of the statute. However, the court held that classification by intimacy of
relationship is a valid exercise of legislative judgment based on
the inherent special circumstances of domestic violence. The
court noted that the overwhelming amount of spousal beating
occurs in the home, usually late at night, with only the family
unit present, after the consumption of alcohol, and always out of
police presence. The court reasoned that since married and
cohabitating partners are both members of the high risk category for domestic violence, the legislature's classification was
constitutionally valid.

Kathy A. Alfieri
V. TORTS
A.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

1. Plaintiff, barred by the statute of limitations on a defective

product action, may proceed with suit by alleging that the
manufacturer's fraud was a percipient cause of the injury.
Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 120, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 271 (3rd Dist. 1985). In Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., the court
of appeal vacated a summary judgment by the trial court which
held that all of the plaintiff's (Snow) causes of action against
defendant A.H. Robins Co. (Robins) were barred by the statute
of limitations. The court of appeal determined that Robins' alleged misrepresentation to Snow regarding the Dalkon Shield's
inadequacy as a contraceptive device constituted a triable allegation of fraud, thereby precluding a summary judgment for
defendant.
In 1973 Snow selected the Dalkon Shield as her birth control method. She had been informed by her physician that the
shield was as effective as birth control pills in preventing preg-:
110. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
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nancy. Nevertheless, seventeen months later she underwent a
therapeutic abortion.
In 1981 Snow watched a "60 Minutes"lll program that delineated the shortcomings of the Dalkon Shield, particularly the
manufacturer's concealment of adverse side-effects and the device's higher-than-advertised pregnancy rates. Snow instituted
her suit just under one year after viewing the program.
The general rule on personal injury actions provides for a
one year statute of limitationll2 which begins to run at the time
of injury, even if the victim is unaware of the injury or the
tortfeasor's identity.113 The trial court concluded that Snow's action against Robins was time-barred.
The appellate court noted that Warrington v. Charles Pfizer Co.1l4 began a trend toward a rule providing that the statute
of limitations accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware of facts
relevant to establishing the cause of action and an identifiable
tortfeasor.111l In applying the rule, the trial court first inquires
into the plaintiff's diligence in discovering relevant facts and
then determines whether to suspend (or toll) the statutory time
limits. 11 6 The Snow court expanded Warrington by removing the
plaintiff's burden of diligence when there is sufficient evidence
to show that the defendant concealed facts which the plaintiff
needed to state a claim. ll7
111. A CBS television program that features investigative reports.
112. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
113. 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, ACTIONS §§ 351-352, at 380-81 (3d ed. 1985).
"The cause of action ordinarily accrues when. . . the wrongful act is done and the obligation or liability arises . ..." Id. § 351, at 380 (emphasis in original). "And the general
rule is that the statute will begin to run though the plaintiff is ignorant of his cause of
action or the identity of the wrongdoer." Id. § 352, at 381.
114. Warrington v. Charles Pfizer Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1969).
115. Id. at 569-70, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The court permitted plaintiff a rule of discovery that was limited by a one year statute of limitations accruing from the date of
discovery or from the date when plaintiff should have discovered the tortious injury by
exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.
116. Id.
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) provides a three year
statute of limitations in "[aJn action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The
cause of action in that case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by
the aggreived party, of the facts constituting fraud or mistake." Id.
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Robins contended that Snow's injuries (an unwanted pregnancy and an abortion) were readily apparent and neither insidious nor permanent in nature, and therefore did not implicate
the discovery-of-facts rule. Consequently, Robins argued that
Snow had one year from the date of the abortion to file her action alleging Robins' negligence. The court of appeal agreed.
However, the court determined that Snow's alternate claim alleging that her injuries were proximately caused by Robins'
fraudulent concealment of both the shield's pregnancy rates and
its safety constituted a separate cause of action seeking redress
for a separate wrong.
The court applied both "but for" and "substantial factor"
tests for causationYs The court decided that under either analysis Snow's injuries would not have occurred without the use of
the Dalkon Shield. The court further held that "but for" the
alleged misrepresentations by Robins, the device would not have
been used by Snow. The court concluded that the actionable
wrong was the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation by
Robins, not Snow's unwanted pregnancy or abortion. Moreover,
the court reasoned that the inducement to use the Shield was a
consequence of the wrong rather than the wrong itself.
Consequently, the court held that Snow's cause of action accrued when she learned of the misrepresented pregnancy rates
from "60 Minutes." Because the alleged fraudulent concealment
by Robins prevented Snow from suspecting the incipient cause
of her injuries, the court held she was exempt from Warrington's requirement to diligently discover a cause of action. The
court concluded that Snow was entitled to the three year statute
of limitations for fraud, commencing from the date of the "60
Minutes" program, and that she filed well within that time
118. 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 622, at 2903 (8th ed. 1974)
states in pertinent part:
[I)t is necessary to show that the defendant's negligence contributed in some way to the plaintiff's injury, so that "but for"
the defendant's negligence the injury would not have been sustained. . . . The "but for" rule has traditionally been applied
to determine cause in fact. . . . [T)he term substantial factor
[is used] ... to denote the fact that defendant's conduct has
such effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to
regard it as a cause ... in the popular sense, in which there
... [is) ... the idea of responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
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frame.
The Snow court established a separate legal theory by
which a plaintiff may recover damages in a personal injury action involving a drug or intracorporeal device where the plaintiff
can allege that defendant's fraud caused the physical injury. The
plaintiff can plead fraud as the wrong and the actual injury as a
result of the wrong, and thereby gain considerable latitude in
stating a cause of action which would otherwise be time-barred.
The applicable statute of limitations increases the filing period
from one year to three years, from the time of discovery of the
fraud.
The court in Snow has taken a significant step toward providing the individual plaintiff equal footing in court with a large
pharmaceutical corporation allegedly responsible for causing
thousands of women to suffer.

T.A. Graudin
2.

The statute of limitations in DES cases does not begin to
run until plaintiff knows or should know all the elements
of the cause of action.

Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, 171 Cal. App. 3d 376, 217
Cal. Rptr. 313 (1st Dist. 1985). In Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision of summary judgment. Defendant Abbott Laboratories
had moved for summary judgment on the theory that plaintiff
Kensinger's action was barred by the statute of limitations. The
court of appeal observed that Abbott Laboratories had introduced no evidence showing that as a matter of law Kensinger
should have been aware of a basis for suit more than one year
prior to filing the present cause of action.
In deciding whether to grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court limited its task to finding whether
a triable issue of fact remained to be adjudicated. The court relied on the usual rule to resolve any doubt as to the propriety of
summary judgment against the moving party.1I9 The court noted
119. Sevilla v. Stearns-Roger, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 161 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1980)
(in denying Stearns-Roger's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the stat-
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that this rule was particularly relevant because of Kensinger's
"profound injury and her blamelessness in lack of knowledge of
its causation."
Kensinger was born in January, 1959. Her mother ingested
DES120 while pregnant which resulted in Kensinger's exposure in
utero. The manufacturers removed DES from the market in
1971 because they learned that prenatal exposure to this drug
was associated with adenocarcinoma.l21 When Kensinger was fifteen years old she was diagnosed as having vaginal and cervical
clear cell adenocarcinoma and subsequently underwent surgery
and radiation treatment.
In 1980 Kensinger filed a complaint against numerous pharmaceutical companies. She did so after discovering through a
newspaper article that she had a right to sue without identifying
the particular manufacturer of the specific DES ingested by her
mother. The key causes of action were negligence, strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, breadth of express
warranty and fraud. The complaint alleged that the defendants
manufactured, distributed and sold DES, thereby causing
Kensinger's injuries.
The court observed that the usual statute of limitation in
personal injury actions is one year.122 The parties agreed that
the "rule of discovery"123 controlled and the only dispute focused upon the accrual date under this rule. Relying on G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,124 the court of appeal noted that
where the victim was clearly unaware of the cause of injury and
ute of limitations in products liability actions begins to run from the date of injury
rather than from the date the product was purchased).
120. PflYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1142 (39th ed. 1985). "Diethylstilbestrol [DES] is
a . . . synthetic estrogenic substance capable of producing all the pharmacologic and
therapeutic responses attributed to natural estrogens." [d. DES was prescribed for the
prevention of miscarriages or spontaneous abortions.
121. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 15 (W. Morris ed. 1976). An adenocarcinoma is "[a] malignant tumor originating in glandular tissue." [d.
122. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) provides that
"[w]ithin one year ... an action for ... injury to ... one caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another . . . ." [d.
123. Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal. App. 3d, 398, 407, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716
(1980) (the period of limitation begins to accrue only when the plaintiff actually discovers or by exercising reasonable diligence should have discovered both injury and its
cause).

124. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
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where the pathology occurred with imperceptable trauma, the
limitations period was delayed.
Kensinger contended that the period of limitation did not
begin to accrue until 1980 when she was both fully cognizant of
the defendant's tortious conduct125 and had discovered her right
to sue under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 128 Abbott Laboratories argued that Kensinger's 1980 suit was time-barred because
she had known the cause of her injuries since 1977.127
In applying the rule of discovery the court struggled with
the question of whether Kensinger's discovery of the cause of
action was reasonably delayed. The court recognized that the
statute of limitations commences with the appearance of a recognizable event and not with the belated discovery of a legal
theory. However, the distinction between legal theories and operative facts is not always clear, particularly with drug product
liability cases. The court concluded that even if a plaintiff is
aware of an injury and its cause, he or she may not know a particular defendant committed any wrong and in such an instance
litigation may be premature.

Call v. Kezirian128 controlled for the Kensinger court. In
Call, the parents knew that their child was born with Down's
syndrome, but did not know until much later that the condition
was due to the physician negligently forgetting to tell them
about amniocentesis. 129 The Call court decided that whether the
plaintiffs should have known of the defendant's negligence was a
question of fact and not of law. The defendant failed to conclusively establish that the parents were put on notice of defendant's negligence upon the birth of their child. The accrual period
was therefore extended.
125. Plaintiff asserted defendant "fail led] to adequately test the effects of DES
upon the offspring of those subjects to whom the drug was administered, and fail led] to
warn of the known risks of DES."
126. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P. 2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (defendant drug manufacturer has the burden of negating and apportioning damages in DES cases through
market share liability).
127. In 1977, an attorney advised Kensinger's father that Kensinger could not bring
a successful suit for her injuries.
128. 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 195 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982).
129. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 53 (5th ed. 1982). "Amniocentesis is the
transabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac." [d. It is a diagnostic test used
to discover fetal abnormalities. [d.
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Applying Call, the Kensinger court held that "[k]nowledge
of the occurrence and origin of harm cannot necessarily be
equated with knowledge of the factual basis for a legal remedy."
The court decided it would be unfair to J:,ar a suit when the
plaintiff did not know her legal rights had been violated.
Whether Kensinger's ignorance was reasonable under the circumstances was a question of fact.
Persuaded by the reasoning of Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories,130 the court of appeal said that the limitation period begins
to accrue only when a plaintiff knows or should have known of a
drug manufacturer's wrongdoing. The twelve plaintiff women in
Anthony knew their physical injuries were the result of DES exposure but did not know of the defendant's wrongful conduct
until later.
Abbott Laboratories in Kensinger argued that if the accrual
period was delayed until the plaintiff knew of the drug manufacturer's wrongdoing, then the statute of limitation would be negated. The court responded that it had adopted an objective test
be~ause the plaintiff still must use reasonable diligence to discover that the defendant committed an actionable wrong.
The court of appeal was sensitive to the difficulties a plaintiff has in establishing exact time periods for drug-related injuries. This decision lends further credence to Sindell and demonstrates California's commitment to hold drug manufacturers

130. 490 A.2d 43, 46 (R.I. 1985). court reasoned that
in a drug product-liability action where the manifestation of
an injury, the cause of that injury, and the person's knowledge
of the wrongdoing by the manufacturer occur at different
points in time, the running of the statute of limitations would
begin when the person discovers, or with reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the
manufacturer."
[d.
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liable for their defective products and negligence.
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